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Abstract
We examine how interaction choices depend on the interplay of social and physical distance, and
show that agents who are more central in the social network, or are located closer to the geographic
center of interaction, choose higher levels of interactions in equilibrium. As a result, the level of
interactivity in the economy as a whole will rise with the density of links in the social network and
with the degree to which agents are clustered in physical space. When agents can choose geographic
locations, there is a tendency for those who are more central in the social network to locate closer
to the interaction center, leading to a form of endogenous geographic separation based on social
distance. Finally, we show that the market equilibrium is not optimal because of social externalities.
We determine the value of the subsidy to interactions that could support the ﬁrst-best allocation as
an equilibrium and show that interaction eﬀort and the incentives for clustering are higher under
the subsidy program.
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11 Introduction
Cities exist because proximity facilitates interactions between economic agents. There are few, if
any, fundamental issues in urban economics that do not hinge in some way on reciprocal action
or inﬂuence between or among workers and ﬁrms. Thus, the localization of industry arises from
intra-industry knowledge spillovers in Marshall (1890), while the transmission of ideas through local
inter-industry interaction fosters innovation in Jacobs (1969). In fact, the face-to-face interactions
that Jacobs emphasizes are believed to be so critical to cities that Gaspar and Glaeser (1997) (and
others) have asked whether advances in communication and information technology might make
cities obsolete. As Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001, pp. 90) note: “Cities themselves are networks
and the existence, growth, and decline of urban agglomerations depend to a large extent on these
interactions.”
The interactions that underlie the formation of urban areas are also important in other contexts.
Following Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988) views the local interactions that lead to knowledge
spillovers as an important component of the process of endogenous economic growth. Non-market
interactions also ﬁgure prominently in contemporary studies of urban crime (Glaeser, Sacerdote
and Scheinkman, 1996; Verdier and Zenou, 2004), earnings and unemployment (Topa, 2001, Calvó-
Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Moretti, 2004; Bayer, Ross and Topa, 2008; Zenou, 2009), peer
eﬀects in education (de Bartolome, 1990; Benabou, 1993; Epple and Romano, 1998), local human
capital externalities and the persistence of inequality (Benabou, 1996, and Durlauf, 1996) and civic
engagement and prosperity (Putnam, 1993).
While there is broad agreement that nonmarket interactions are essential to cities and impor-
tant for economic performance more broadly, the mechanisms through which local interactions
generate external eﬀects are not well understood. The dominant paradigm lies in models of spatial
interaction, which assume that knowledge, or some other source of increasing returns, arises as a
by-product of the production marketable goods. The level of the externality that is available to
a particular ﬁrm or worker depends on its location relative to the source of the external eﬀect —
the spillover is assumed to attenuate with distance — and on the spatial arrangement of economic
activity. There is a rich literature (whose keystones include Beckmann, 1976; Fujita and Ogawa,
1980; and Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002)1 that examines how such spatial externalities inﬂuence
the location of ﬁrms and households, urban density patterns, and productivity. There is also a
substantial empirical literature (including Jaﬀee, Tratjenberg and Henderson, 1993; Rosenthal and
Strange, 2003, 2008; and Argazi and Henderson, 2008) demonstrating that knowledge spillovers do
in fact attenuate with distance. Finally, there are more speciﬁc models that treat part of the in-
1See Fujita and Thisse (2002) for a literature review.
2teraction process as endogenous. For example, Glaeser (1999) examines a model in which random
contacts inﬂuence skill acquisition, while Helsley and Strange (2004) consider a model in which
randomly matched agents choose whether and how to exchange knowledge.
This paper uses recent results from the theory of social networks to open the black box of
local nonmarket interactions. We consider a population of agents who have positions within a
social network and locations in a geographic space. As in Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008), we
use the tools of graph theory to model the social network. In this model the value of interaction
eﬀort increases with the eﬀorts of others with whom one has direct links in the social network. As
in Helsley and Strange (2007) and Zenou (2011), all interactions take place at a point in space,
the interaction center. We examine how interaction choices depend on the interplay of social and
physical distance, and show that agents who are more central in the social network, or are located
closer to interaction center, choose higher levels of interactions in equilibrium. As a result, the level
of interactivity in the economy as a whole will rise with the density of links in the social network
and with the degree to which agents are clustered in physical space. When agents can choose
geographic locations, there is a tendency for those who are more central in the social network to
locate closer to the interaction center, leading to a form of endogenous geographic separation based
on social distance. Finally, we show that the market equilibrium is not optimal because of social
externalities. We determine the value of the subsidy to interactions that could support the ﬁrst-best
allocation as an equilibrium, and show that interaction eﬀort and the incentives for clustering are
higher under the subsidy program.
There is a growing interest in theoretical models of peer eﬀects and social networks (see e.g.
Akerlof, 1997; Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996; Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou,
2006; Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou, 2009). However, there are very few papers that
consider the interaction of social and physical distance. Brueckner, Thisse and Zenou (2002), Helsley
and Strange (2007), Brueckner and Largey (2008) and Zenou (2011) are exceptions. However, in
these models the social network is not explicitly modeled.2 To the best of our knowledge, this is
the ﬁrst model that combines an explicit analysis of social networks with an explicit analysis of
geographic location.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of interaction with
social and physical distance, and solves for equilibrium interaction patterns. Section 3 extends
the model to consider location choice and shows that agents who are more central in the social
network will tend to locate closer to the center of interactions, ceteris paribus. Section 4 considers
eﬃcient interaction patterns and policies that will support the optimum as an equilibrium. Section
2See Ioannides (2011, Chap. 5) who reviews the literature on social interactions and urban economics.
35 discusses our results and concludes.
2 Equilibrium interactions with exogenous location
2.1 The model
2.1.1 Summary
There are n agents in the economy, each of whom beneﬁts from interacting with others. The eﬀort
that an agent devotes to interactions, and the beneﬁt that is subsequently received, depends on the
agent’s position in a social network and on the agent’s location relative to an exogenous interaction
center. Agents who are more central in the social network choose a higher level of eﬀort, ceteris
paribus, as do agents who are located closer to the interaction center. The model examines how
position in the social network and geographic location combine to determine an equilibrium level
of interactivity for each agent and for the economy as a whole.
2.1.2 Locations and the social network
The geography consists of two locations, a center, where all interactions occur, and a periphery. All
agents are located in either the center or the periphery. The distance between the center and the
periphery is normalized to one. Thus, letting xi represent the location of agent i, deﬁned as her
distance from the interaction center, we have xi ∈ {0,1},∀i = 1,2,...,n. In this section we assume
that locations are exogenous; location choice is considered in Section 3.
The social space is a network. A network g is a set of ex ante identical agents N = {1,...,n},
n ≥ 2, and a set of links or direct connections between them. These connections inﬂuence the
beneﬁt that an agent receives from interactions, in a manner that is made precise below. The
adjacency matrix G = [gij] keeps track of the direct connections in the network. By deﬁnition,
agents i and j are directly connected if and only if gij = 1; otherwise, gij = 0. We assume that if
gij = 1, then gji = 1, so the network is undirected.3 By convention, gii = 0. G is thus a square
(0,1) symmetric matrix with zeros on its diagonal.
3Our model can be extended to allow for directed networks (i.e. non-symmetric relationships) and weighted links
in a straightforward way.
42.1.3 Preferences
Consumers derive utility from a numeraire good z and interactions with others according to the
transferrable utility function
Ui(vi,v−i,g) = zi + ui(vi,v−i,g), (1)
where vi is the number of visits that agent i makes to the center, v−i is the corresponding vector of
visits for the other n − 1 agents, and ui(vi,v−i,g) is the subutility function of interactions. Thus,
utility depends on the visit choice of agent i, the visit choices of other agents and on agent i’s
position in the social network g. We imagine that each visit results in one interaction, so that the
aggregate number of visits is a measure of aggregate interactivity. For tractability, we assume that
the subutility function takes the linear quadratic form








where α > 0 and θ > 0 (the roles of these parameters will become clear shortly). Equation (2)
imposes additional structure on the interdependence between agents; under (2) the utility of agent
i depends on her own visit choice and on the visit choices of the agents with whom she is directly
connected in the network, i.e., those for whom gij = 1.
Agents located in the periphery must travel to the center to interact with others. Letting y
represent income and t represent marginal transport cost, budget balance implies that expenditure
on the numeraire is
zi = y − txivi. (3)
Using this expression to substitute for zi in (1), and using (2), gives








where αi = α − txi. We assume α > t, so that αi > 0, ∀xi ∈ {0,1} and hence ∀i = 1,2,...n. Note
from (4) that utility is concave in own visits, ∂2Ui
∂v2
i
= −1. Note also that the marginal utility of vi is
increasing in the visits of another with whom i is directly connected, ∂2Ui
∂vi∂vj = θ, for gij = 1. Thus,
vi and vj are strategic complements from i’s perspective when gij = 1. Each agent i chooses vi to
maximize (4) taking the structure of the network and the visit choices of other agents as given.
Before analyzing this game, we introduce a useful measure of an agent’s importance in the social
network.
52.1.4 The Katz-Bonacich network centrality measure
There are many ways to measure the importance or centrality of an agent in a social network. For
example, degree centrality measures importance by the number of direct connections that an agent
has with all others, while closeness centrality measures importance by the average distance (in
terms of links in the network) between an agent and all others. See Wasserman and Faust (1994)
and Jackson (2008) for discussions of these, and many other, characteristics of social and economic
networks. The Katz-Bonacich centrality measure (due to Katz, 1953, and Bonacich, 1987), which
has proven to be extremely useful in game theoretic applications (Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and
Zenou, 2006), “presumes that the power or prestige of a node is simply a weighted sum of the walks
that emanate from it” (Jackson, 2008, pp. 41).
To formalize this measure, let Gk be the kth power of G, with elements g
[k]
ij , where k is an
integer. The matrix Gk keeps track of the indirect connections in the network: g
[k]
ij ≥ 0 gives the
number of walks or paths of length k ≥ 1 from i to j in the network g. In particular, G0 = I.
Consider the matrix M =
 +∞




ij , count the
number of walks of all lengths from i to j in the network g, where walks of length k are weighted
by θk. These expressions are well-deﬁned for small enough values of θ.4 The parameter θ is a decay
parameter that scales down the relative weight of longer walks. Note that, when M is well-deﬁned,
one can write M−θGM = I and hence M = [I−θG]
−1.5 The Katz-Bonacich centrality of agent i,




k converges if and only if














where r is the radius of convergence and  G  is the “norm” of the matrix G. This norm is generally taken to be
the “spectral radius” of G, written ρ(G) = maxi |λi|, where λi is an eigenvalue of G. Thus, the matrix power series
converges, and M is well-deﬁned, for θρ(G) < 1. Convergence of the matrix power series constructively establishes the
existence of the inverse [I − θG]
−1, where I is the identity matrix. The condition θρ(G) < 1 relates the payoﬀ function
to the network topology. When this condition holds, the local payoﬀ interdependence θ is lower than the inverse of
the spectral radius of G, which is a measure of connectivity in the network. When this condition does not hold,
existence of equilibrium becomes an issue because the strategy space is unbounded (see Ballester, Calvó-Armengol
and Zenou, 2006).
5Indeed, expanding the power series gives









Subtracting the latter from the former gives M−θGM = I.












The Katz-Bonacich centrality of any agent is zero when the network is empty. It is also zero for
θ = 0, and is increasing and convex in θ for θ > 0. For future reference, it is convenient to note
that the (n × 1) vector of Katz-Bonacich centralities can be written in matrix form as
b(g,θ) = M1 = [I − θG]
−1 1, (6)
where 1 is the n−dimensional vector of ones.
2.2 Nash equilibrium visits and interactivity
The ﬁrst-order condition for a maximum of (4) with respect to vi gives the best-response function
v∗




j ∀i = 1,2,...n. (7)
Thus, due to the linear quadratic form in (2), the optimal visit choice of agent i is a linear function
of the visit choices of the agents to whom i is directly connected in the network. In matrix form
the system in (7) becomes v = α + θGv, where α is the (n × 1) vector of the αi’s. Solving for v
and using (6) gives the Nash equilibrium visit vector v∗:
v∗ = [I−θG]
−1 α = Mα. (8)













where x−i is the vector of locations for the other n − 1 agents. The expression on the right in (9)
is the weighted Katz-Bonacich centrality of agent i, where the weight attached to the walks from i









This analysis is summarized by the following proposition:6
6For a formal proof, apply Theorem 1 in Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou (2009) for β = 1, γ = 0, and
λ = θ.
7Proposition 1 (Equilibrium visits) For any network g and for suﬃciently small θ, i.e. θρ(G) <
1, there exists a unique, interior Nash equilibrium in visit choices in which the number of visits by
any agent i equals her weighted Katz-Bonacich centrality,
v∗
i (xi,x−i,g) = bαi(g,θ). (11)
The Nash equilibrium number of visits v∗
i (xi,x−i,g) depends on position in the social network
and geographic location. Proposition 1 implies that an agent who is more central in the social net-
work, as measured by her Katz-Bonacich centrality, will make more visits to the interaction center
in equilibrium. Intuitively, agents who are better connected have more to gain from interacting
with others and so exert higher interaction eﬀort for any vector of geographic locations.
We would like to see how the equilibrium number of visits v∗
i(xi,x−i,g) varies with the diﬀerent
parameters of the model. It is straightforward to verify that v∗
i (xi,x−i,g) increases with α and
decreases with commuting costs t. It is less straighforward to analyze the relationship between
v∗
i (xi,x−i,g) and the intensity of social interactions θ, which is also a measure of complementarity
in the network.7 We have the following the result whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 (Intensity of social interactions) Assume θρ(G) < 1. Then, for any net-
work, an increase in the intensity of social interactions θ raises the equilibrium number of visits
v∗
i (xi,x−i,g) by any agent i.
When there are a lot of synergies from social interactions, each agent ﬁnds it desirable to visit
the center more because the beneﬁts are higher. The same intuition prevails for α. On the contrary,
when commuting costs increase, then the number of visits to the center decreases.
Let us now analyze aggregate eﬀects. From (9), v∗
i (xi,x−i,g) is non-increasing in xi,
v∗
i (1,x−i,g) − v∗
i (0,x−i,g) = −tmii ≤ 0 (12)
since M is a non-negative matrix. Any agent for whom mii > 0 will make more interaction
visits, or exert higher interaction eﬀort, when located in the center rather than the periphery. In
fact, reﬂecting the complementarity in visit choices, the equilibrium visit choice of agent i is non-
increasing in the distance of any agent from the interaction center. Letting x−ik be the vector of
locations for all agents except i and k, so x−i = (xk,x−ik), we have
v∗
i (xi,(1,x−ik),g) − v∗





= θ for gij = 1.
8Let V ∗(g) represent the equilibrium aggregate level of visits, or, for simplicity, the equilibrium









Consider an alternative social network g′, g′  = g such that for all i, j, g′
ij = 1 if gij = 1. It is
conventional to refer to g and g′ as nested networks, and to denote their relationship as g ⊂ g′.
As discussed in Ballester et al. (2006), the network g′ has a denser structure of network links:
some agents who are not directly connected in g are directly connected in g′. Then, given the
complementarities in the network, it must be the case that equilibrium visits are weakly larger
for all agents, which implies V ∗(g′) > V ∗(g). Similarly, (12) and (13) imply that V ∗(g) is non-
increasing in the distance of any agent from the interaction center. Thus, the more compact is the
spatial arrangement of agents, the greater is the level of aggregate interactions for any network g.
This analysis is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Aggregate interactions) For suﬃciently small θ, aggregate interactions in-
crease with the density of network links and decrease with the distance of any agent from the
interaction center.
This is an interesting result since it analyzes the relationship between network structure and
aggregate interactions. It says, for example, that a star-shaped network will have fewer social
interactions than a complete network because agents enjoy fewer local complementarities in the
former than in the latter.
2.3 Example
To illustrate the previous results, consider the following star-shaped social network g with three
agents (i.e. n = 3), where agent 1 holds a central position whereas agents 2 and 3 are peripherals:
￿ ￿ ￿
2 1 3
Figure 1: A star network with 3 individuals































For instance, we deduce from G3 that there are exactly two walks of length three between agents 1
and 2, namely, 12 → 21 → 12 and 12 → 23 → 32. Obviously, there is no walk of this length (and,
in general, of odd length) from any agent to herself. It is easily veriﬁed that:
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Suppose now that, for exogenous reasons, individuals 1 and 2 reside in the center, i.e., x1 = x2 = 0
while individual 3 lives at the periphery, i.e., x3 = 1. This implies that α1 = α2 = α and


















(1 + 2θ)α − θt
(1 + θ)α − θ2t
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In that case, the eﬀort exerted by agent 1, the most central player, is the highest one. Interestingly,
even if individuals 2 and 3 have the same position in the network, because of the locational advantage
in the geographical space, individual 2 has a higher weighted Katz-Bonacich centrality and thus
provide higher eﬀort than individual 3. As a result, agents located closer to the center have higher
centrality bαi(g,θ) and thus higher eﬀort (i.e. they visit more often the center to interact with
8Note that this centrality measures are only well-deﬁned when θ < 1/
√
2 or θ
2 < 1/2 (condition on the largest
eigenvalue).
9Observe that this inequality is true because we have assumed that θ < 1/
√
2 (this guarantees that the Katz-
Bonacich centrality is well-deﬁned) and α > t.
10other people). Note that, in equilibrium, each agent i’s eﬀort is aﬀected by the location of all
other agents in the network but distant neighbors have less impact due to the decay factor θ in the
Katz-Bonacich centrality.






(3 + 4θ)α − (1 + θ)t
 
1 − 2θ2 
Let us now illustrate Proposition 3. Consider the network described in Figure 1 and add one link
between individuals 2 and 3 so that we switch from a star-shaped network to a complete one.
Suppose that we have the same geographical conﬁguration, i.e. individuals 1 and 2 reside in the
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3 since all individuals have the same position in the social network
but individual 3 has a “disadvantage” in the geographical space. Total activity in this network,
denoted by g[+23], is then equal to:
V ∗(g[+23]) =
(3 + 3θ)α − t(1 − θ + 2θ)




This section extends our model of social networks and interaction to allow agents to choose between
locating in the center and the periphery. To begin, and to make matters extremely simple, we
suppose that there is an exogenous cost diﬀerential C > 0 associated with the central location.
Assuming that the center has more economic activity generally, this cost diﬀerential might arise from
congestion eﬀects or reﬂect a diﬀerence in location rent from competition among other activities for
center locations. Agents choose locations to maximize net utility, that is, utility from interactions
minus the exogenous location cost, taking the visits of other agents as given.














10It is easily veriﬁed that the condition on the largest eigenvalue is now given by: θ < 1/2.


















i (0,x−i,g) − v∗
i (1,x−i,g)][v∗
i (0,x−i,g) + v∗
i (1,x−i,g)]}
From the best-response function (7), we have:
v∗






















Our earlier assumption that α > t implies ∆U∗
i > 0, ∀i. Not surprisingly, any agent has higher
utility if located at the center. However, (20) shows that the utility diﬀerential is linearly increasing
in v∗
i (0,x−i,g), which in turn equals agent i’s weighted Bonacich centrality (for the appropriate
value of α) by Proposition 1. This positive relationship between ∆U∗
i and v∗
i , is the key determinant
of location choice: it shows that the beneﬁt of a locating in the geographic center is greater for an
agent who is more central in the social network.
To simplify notation, let v∗
i0 ≡ v∗




n0, so that the weighted Katz-Bonacich centrality of agent i (for the
appropriate value of α) is not larger than that of agent i−1. If ∆U∗
n < C and ∆U∗
1 > C, then, by
continuity and the intermediate value theorem, there must exist a v∗
￿ i0 such that t
 
v∗
￿ i0 − t/2
 
= C
(see Figure 2). All agents i ≤   i will have higher net utility locating at the center; conversely,
all agents i >   i will have higher net utility locating at the periphery. Thus, the bifurcation at   i
generates a Nash equilibrium in geographic locations: no agent wants to deviate from this pattern,
taking the visit choices of other agents as given. If C > ∆U∗
1, then all agents will choose the
periphery. If C < ∆U∗
n, all agents will choose the center. For intermediate values, the equilibrium
has the property that the most central agents locate close to the interaction center to economize
on the transportation costs associated with high levels of visits or interaction eﬀort. This analysis
is summarized in the following Proposition.
12Proposition 4 (Equilibrium locations) Place agents in non-descending order based on their
centralities in the social network. If the cost of locating in the center, C, is such that
∆U∗
n < C < ∆U∗
1 (21)
where ∆U∗
i is the increment to utility from locating in the center for agent i, then there is a critical
type   i such that all agents who are more central in the social network than   i locate in the center,
while all agents who are less central than   i locate in the periphery.
Proposition 4 expresses the salient relationship between position in the social network and
geographic location. If participation in a social network involves costly transportation, then agents
who occupy more central positions in the social network will have the most to gain from locating
at the interaction center. In our model with two locations, in equilibrium agents who are most
central in the social network will locate at the interaction center, while agents who are less central
in the social network locate in the periphery. There is, in eﬀect, endogenous geographic separation
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Figure 2: Nash equilibrium locations
An increase in C will increase the centrality of the marginal agent   i and lead (at least weakly)
to less spatial concentration at the interaction center. Similarly, an increase in marginal transport
cost t, will cause ∆Ui to shift down in Figure 2. This will lead to an increase in the centrality of
13the marginal agent   i and a decrease in spatial concentration at the interaction center. Finally, an
increase in θ, the intensity of social interactions, will increase v∗
i0 for all i and thus lead to more
spatial concentration in the center. This discussion is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 (Spatial concentration in the center) An decrease in the cost of locating in
the center, a decrease in marginal transport cost, or an increase in the intensity of social interac-
tions, will lead to more spatial concentration of agents in the center.
3.2 Example
Let us return to the network described in Figure 1. We can now calculate the equilibrium utility
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with αi = α − txi. Let us show that there exists an equilibrium where individuals 1 and 2 live in
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We have an equilibrium with individuals 1 and 2 in the center and individual 3 in the periphery if:
∆U∗
1 > C, ∆U∗




2, we need to check that:
∆U∗
3 < C < ∆U∗
2
which is condition (21) in Proposition 4. These conditions are equivalent to:
(1 + θ)α −
 
1 − θ2 
t <
 







< (1 + θ)α − θ2t (23)
Since (1 + θ)α −
 
1 − θ2 
t < (1 + θ)α − θ2t, such an equilibrium always exists if (26) holds.
144 Welfare analysis and subsidy policies
4.1 First-best analysis
We would like to see if the equilibrium outcomes are eﬃcient in terms of social interactions. For































First-order condition gives for each i = 1,...,n:11







which implies that (since gij = gji):12
vO












i is the Nash equilibrium number of visits given in (7). This means that there are too few
visits at the Nash equilibrium as compared to the social optimum outcome. Equilibrium interaction
eﬀort is too low because each agent ignores the positive impact of a visit on the visit choices of
others, that is, each agent ignores the positive externality arising from complementarity in visit
choices. As a result, the market equilibrium is not eﬃcient and the planner would like to subsidize
visits to the interaction center.
4.2 Subsidizing social interactions
Letting SO






11It is easily checked that there is a unique maximum for each vi.
12The superscript O refers to the “social optimum” outcome while a star refers to the “Nash equilibrium” outcome.
15If we add one stage before the visit game is played, the planner will announce the optimal subsidy
SO
i to each agent i such that:





















By doing so, the planner will restore the ﬁrst best. Observe that the optimal subsidy is such that











































What is interesting here is that the planner will give a larger subsidy to more central agents in the
social network. Let us summarize our results by the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Optimal level of social interactions) The Nash equilibrium outcome in terms
of social interactions is not eﬃcient since there are too few social interactions. If the planner
proposes a subsidy SO
i = θ
 
j gijvj to each individual i, then the ﬁrst-best outcome can be restored.
In that case, it is optimal for the planner to give higher subsidies to more central agents in the
social network.
4.3 Location with eﬃcient interactions
We would like now to investigate a constrained eﬃcient allocation in which the planner can subsidize
interactions (i.e., provide a subsidy of SO
i per visit by agent i) but cannot directly control location
choices.







As stated above, due to the obvious network externality, every agents makes more visits, or chooses
a higher level of interaction eﬀort, in the optimum than in the Nash equilibrium. Note that, in











If agents make location decisions as before, taking the choices of others as given, then the utility
diﬀerential associated with locating in the center for agent i under the subsidy SO










Now consider the marginal type in the periphery  i from the equilibrium program. By construction,
setting integer problems aside, for this type,
∆U∗
￿ i = t
 
v∗






i (0,x−i,g) > v∗
i(0,x−i,g) for all i, we have:
∆UO
￿ i = t
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This means that under the subsidy program that supports eﬃcient interactions, the marginal type
in the periphery from the equilibrium program wants to move to the center, that is  iO <  i∗. Figure
3 displays these two solutions. Indeed, since all agents devote more eﬀort to interacting with
others under the subsidy program in (26), the incentives for clustering must be stronger under that
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Figure 3: Nash equilibrium versus optimal location choices
Proposition 7 (Equilibrium versus optimal location choices) If the planner proposes a per
visit subsidy SO
i to each individual i, then, compared to the Nash equilibrium location choices, more
agents live in the center.
4.4 Example
Let us return to the network described in Figure 1 and to the example from Section 3.2. There
we showed that there exists a Nash equilibrium where individuals 1 and 2 live in the center and




j gijvj per visit by agent i. In the context of the network described in Figure 1, we
have:
SO
1 = θ(v2 + v3) and SO
2 = SO
3 = θv1 (27)
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13The largest eigenvalue of G is still given by
√
2. The condition on the largest eigenvalue is, however, given by
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2 , the condition for this equilibrium to exist is ∆UO
3 < C < ∆UO
2 , that is:
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< (1 + 2θ)α − 4θ2t (28)
Let us now show that under the optimal subsidy policy, there can be an equilibrium for which all
agents live in the center while this is not possible in the pure Nash equilibrium case. The subsidies









































The condition that guarantees that all agents live in the center is therefore ∆UO
2 > C (since
∆UO
1 > ∆UO












1 − 8θ2 (29)
Now, if we perform the same analysis for the Nash equilibrium case, it can be shown that the
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19Since 1+2θ
1−8θ2 > 1+θ
1−2θ2, it is clear that (30) is much more restrictive than (29). As a result, when
1 + θ













holds, it is optimal for all three agents to choose to reside in the center under the subsidy program
while at most two agents will locate in the center if no subsidy is received. This example illustrates
Proposition 7. Indeed, when all agents receive a subsidy, it becomes less costly to travel to the
center to interact with other agents and, as a result, they all devote more eﬀort to interacting with
others. This leads to a spatial conﬁguration where incentives for clustering are stronger under the
subsidy program than in the Nash equilibrium.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper provides what we believe to be the ﬁrst analysis of the interaction between position in
a social network and position in a geographic space, or between social and physical distance. We
have developed a model in which agents who are more central in a social network, or are located
closer to an interaction center, choose higher levels of interaction eﬀort in equilibrium. As a result,
the level of interactivity in the economy as a whole rises with with density of links in the social
network and with the degree to which agents are clustered in physical space. When agents can
choose geographic locations, there is a tendency for those who are more central in the social network
to locate closer to the interaction center.
There are many potential extensions and applications of the work described here. For example,
we have assumed that all interactions occur at a single, exogenous interaction center. In reality,
interactions in cities occur at many sites, and whether a site becomes a focal point for interactions
is of course endogenous. As in all models of complementarity, there is an interesting coordination
problem in the endogenous determination of the location of an interaction center in this model.
Natural applications for this analysis arise in studying the location of activities where network
position seems important. For example, the most senior and presumably “best connected” busi-
ness services ﬁrms in cities (law ﬁrms, consulting ﬁrms, accounting ﬁrms, and so on) appear to
concentrate in downtowns, which are generally assumed to be the center of interactions for such
activities. However, in other industries, like the high tech industries of the Silicon Valley, the center
of interactions is actually near the geographic periphery of the metropolitan area. Finally, it might
be interesting to consider relationships between various types of interactions and ﬁrm location. One
might ﬁnd, for example, that when internal and external interactions are complementary, ﬁrms who
are more central in the social network and therefore locate close to the interaction center tend to be
large, while when internal and external interactions are substitutes, ﬁrms who are more central in
20the social network tend to be small. This analysis could also be extended to study the interaction
between electronic interactions, nonmarket interactions and location for ﬁrms or households with
varying positions in a social network.
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24Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. We want to study how bαi (g,θ) varies with θ. We have:























Since G and all its powers are positive matrices, and the coeﬃcients θk increase with θ, it imme-
diately follows that the inﬁnite series result in a matrix with all entries larger or equal than the
inﬁnite series with the initial value of θ. Hence, for any ﬁxed vector of weights α, the weighted






and the result follows.
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